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Abstract
The security of computer networks and systems on
the Internet is a growing and ongoing set of concerns
for  nation  states,  corporations,  and  individuals.
Although substantial and valuable work is in progress
to secure  the hardware and software technologies  of
the  Internet,  less  attention  has  been  paid  to  the
everyday  practices  of  the  people  involved  in
maintaining this infrastructure. In this paper, we focus
on issues in cybersecurity  as they apply to computer
networks,  to show how effective  practices  of  network
security are premised upon social relationships of trust
formed  within  communities  of  cybersecurity
professionals,  and  enacted  in  the  practice  of
cybersecurity.  We  describe  three  key  cybersecurity
problems  that  involve  Internet  infrastructural
technologies:  IP  address  hijacking,  email  spam,  and
DNS  spoofing.  Through  our  analysis  of  these  three
problems, we argue that social trust between people –
not  just  assurances  built  into  the  underlying
technologies – must be emphasized as a central aspect
of securing Internet infrastructure.
1. Introduction 
The  Internet  is  characterized  by  relationships  of
interdependence.  Thousands  of  individual  computer
networks interconnect to form the Internet, relying on
each  other  to  carry  data  traffic  from  origin  to
destination. The resolution of domain names to Internet
protocol  (IP)  addresses  takes  place  through relations
within the quasi-hierarchical  structure of the Domain
Name  System  (DNS).  The  delivery  of  some  of  the
most common and essential data, such as email, takes
place through arbitrary relations between email servers
around the world.
The  intertwined  technological  systems  of  the
Internet are constructed through relationships between
independent, autonomous organizations of people who,
often  invisibly,  administer  these  interconnected
systems.  Thus,  the  practice  of  cybersecurity, broadly
construed,  is  concerned  with  ensuring  the  stable,
reliable  operation  of  interdependent  relationships
among  these  human  organizations  as  well  as  the
technological systems they manage.
We draw  on  critical  studies  of  infrastructure,  to
frame  cybersecurity  for  Internet  infrastructure  as  a
system  of  inter-related  social  and  technological
elements [26][27][28].  Studies  of infrastructure  have,
in  general,  focused  on  the  processes  through  which
infrastructure is designed, developed and deployed, at
scales ranging from localized project-specific contexts
to a societal level. In contrast, we are concerned with
infrastructural  mechanisms  of  relative  stasis,  rather
than change: once deployed, how is an infrastructure
maintained as a stable, ordered system? This is not to
say  that  infrastructure  is  static  in  our  view, but  that
relative stasis – predictable, repeatable behavior – is a
primary goal for infrastructure once deployed, just as
much as relative change (however slow) is a primary
goal  for  infrastructure  in  the  process  of  design,
development  and  deployment.  A  focus  on  relative
stasis in infrastructure calls to attention the processes
through  which  failures  occur  and  are  managed  to
assure order and stability in infrastructure. The analysis
of the relationship between relative stasis and failure
requires study of problems of risk in infrastructure, and
the  associated  practices  and  structures  involved  in
maintenance  (as  responses  to  unintentional,  but
possibly  anticipated,  failures)  and  security  (as
responses to intentional attacks).
The  issues  of  maintenance  and  security  for
infrastructure become substantially more complex once
we consider  problems of  interdependence:  the  stable
operation of an infrastructure is premised upon stable
relationships between interdependent systems, as much
as  on  the  stable  operation  of  the  individual  systems
themselves.  This  is  especially  true  when  the  socio-
technical  relationships  between  the  interdependent
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systems  composing  an  infrastructure  cut  across
territorial and organizational boundaries, as is the case
with  the  Internet  in  general,  and  cybersecurity  in
particular.
A  key  problem  that  any  relationship  of  mutual
interdependence must address is what is at stake in an
interaction, which is most commonly referred to as risk
[5]. To date, the dominant view on cybersecurity is that
risk can be managed through primarily  technological
solutions, assisted by economic analysis of incentives
and appropriate legal frameworks [20][21][22][23]. As
we  argue,  however,  such  solutions  invariably
underestimate  the  critical  importance  of  the  social
relationships  within  the  communities  of  technical
personnel who manage and control these infrastructural
technologies. In our view, trust as a social solution to
managing risk has received insufficient attention in the
analysis  and  design  of  the  Internet's  infrastructural
technologies,  especially  from  a  perspective  of
cybersecurity. We argue that social trust is inherent to
the interdependent nature of the Internet infrastructure,
and  it  must  be  considered  as  a  central  problem  in
cybersecurity.
In this paper, we detail the specific ways in which
risk  manifests  –  and  is  managed  –  in  three  distinct
infrastructural technologies of the Internet. To evaluate
these cases, we draw from three years of ethnographic
fieldwork  in  communities  of  the  Internet's  technical
personnel,  across  North  America  and  South  Asia,
spanning  regional  professional  organizations  and
global governance bodies, which we detail below. Our
aim  is  not  to  provide  a  comprehensive  empirical
analysis of each of the cases from this larger research,
but rather to summarize and contextualize these cases
as significant illustrations in support of our argument. 
First,  we  examine  the  problem  of  IP  address
hijacking,  a  class  of  attack  in  which  one  computer
network claims to host a range of IP addresses which in
actuality  are hosted by another  network.  Second,  we
present the problem of email spam, which is among the
most  easily  visible  forms  of  risk  that  Internet  users
commonly experience. Finally, we analyze the problem
of  DNS  spoofing,  in  which  a  DNS  server  sends
spurious  responses  to  clients,  directing  them  to  IP
addresses  other  than those of  the service which they
requested. 
We  chose  these  three  cases  because  they  each
illustrate different types of risk that must be mitigated
in order to maintain the security and reliability of the
Internet infrastructure.  Through a descriptive analysis
of these three problem areas, we show how social trust
is integral to the practice of operating the technological
infrastructure of the Internet.  We focus on the nature
of  interdependence  in  the  technological  system,  the
quality of the risks that result, and the role that social
trust relations play in the management of these risks.
Finally,  we  conclude  our  analysis  with  a  series  of
specific  recommendations about how social  trust  can
be  emphasized  in  both  the  study  and  practice  of
maintaining a secure and reliable Internet.
2. Trust and Interdependence
Trust is a complex construct that has many different
definitions and meanings in social  science,  computer
science,  and  related  disciplines.  However,  all
conceptions  of  trust  seek  to  address  a  common
problem: the management of expectations in the face
of  potentially  risky,  uncertain  interactions.  Before
applying  the  concept  of  trust  to  our  specific
cybersecurity  problems,  we  first  review  the  key
differences in trust and trust-related terms.
Individual  models  of  interpersonal  trust  focus  on
why one person might choose to take a risk on another,
calling  attention  to  individual  attitudes,  emotional
content  and  cognitive  dimensions.  Since  no-one  can
ever  have  complete  knowledge  to  anticipate  another
person's  behavior,  the  ability  to  trust  is  essential  to
social  interactions  [1].  In  contrast,  system  trust
describes  the  trust  that  individuals  must  have  in  the
infrastructures  –  such  as  water,  electricity  and
communications  –  that  support  everyday  life.  In  the
absence  of  any  meaningful  understanding  or  power
over how these infrastructures function, the trust that
individuals  have  in  the  reliable  operation  of  these
infrastructures  is  premised upon confidence that  they
will  not  fail,  rather  than an active choice taken with
knowledge of risk [2][3].
Since  our  concern  is  with  interdependence  in
social-technical  systems,  we  adopt  a  model  of  trust
which  takes  human  relationships  as  its  primary
building  block  [4][5][6].  In  this  model,  trust  is
conceived  of  as  a  three  part  relation,  in  which  one
person trusts another  in  relation to  a  specific  action.
For instance, it is not uncommon for individuals to ask
strangers to watch their bags at the airport for a few
minutes,  but  it  is  unlikely that  someone might ask a
stranger to watch a child in the same context. Trust is
not  merely a  matter  of  the  relationship between two
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people,  but  also  of  the  magnitude  of  the  risks  in  a
particular context.
In the above examples,  an expectation of trust  is
made possible through the evaluation of whether or not
a person is trustworthy. At an airport, this might simply
be a matter of trust-warranting cues [6]: for example,
what the stranger looks like, how they are dressed, etc.
In  ongoing  interactions,  however,  the  evaluation  of
trustworthiness may arise from reputation constructed
through knowledge of prior interactions. For instance,
a  regular  customer  of  a  neighborhood  shop  may  be
trusted  by  the  shop owner  to  run  up  a  tab,  while  a
customer  visiting  the  shop  for  the  first  time  would
likely be asked to pay immediately.
This conception of trust implies an ability to choose
whether  or  not  to  trust,  and  whom  to  trust:  in  the
absence of choice,  what is colloquially referred to as
‘trust’  may  be  better  described  as  a  confidence  in
expected  outcomes [7].  Confidence  is  made possible
through  assurance  structures  which  are  designed  to
minimize risk. Assurance structures may be centralized
authorities  (as  in  central  banks  assuring  that  paper
money has value) or social norms (as in punishments
such as exclusion or other penalties) which ensure that
expectations  are  met  in  social  relationships  [8].  In
everyday  life,  ongoing  interpersonal  relationships
between  parties  often  function  through some mix of
trust and assurances.
Trust  relationships  and  assurance  structures  are
produced and reproduced in professional communities
and  institutional  forms,  and  enacted  in  the  everyday
practice  of  administering  Internet  infrastructure.
Individuals enter into trust relationships in order to be
effective in their practice, forming these relationships
through engagement with communities of practice [9]
of  technical  personnel  involved  in  managing  the
everyday  operation  of  Internet  infrastructure.  These
communities,  practices  and  trust  relationships  are  in
turn  anchored  by  assurance  structures,  which
encompass  behavioral  norms  in  the  operation  of
technology  (often  characterized  and  documented  as
“best  practices”)  as  well  as  organizational  forms
specialized  to  administer  particular  aspects  of
technology.
We follow these lines of analysis in the cases  we
present below, to show that while the nature of risk and
uncertainty  can  and  should  be  characterized  in
technological  terms,  the  responses  to  risk  and
uncertainty  must  be  analyzed  in  terms  of  practices
engaged  in  by  professional  communities,  enabled
through  social  trust  relationships  and  assurance
structures.
3. Methods and Materials
The cases we present in the sections which follow
are based on three years of ethnographic fieldwork in
communities  of  the  Internet's  technical  personnel
across North America and South Asia. Over 50 semi-
structured interviews were conducted in the course of
this research, alongside participant observation during
meetings and conferences of professional associations
and  governance  bodies  involved  in  the  operation  of
Internet infrastructure. In addition, a variety of textual
materials  generated  by  the  technical  communities
represented  by  these  organizations  were  analyzed,
including email lists, best practices documents, policy
documents and standards documents.
Fieldwork  was  concentrated  on  regionally
organized  professional  communities  of  network
administrators in North America and South Asia:  the
North American Network Operators Group (NANOG)
and  the  South  Asia  Network  Operators  Group
(SANOG). In addition, fieldwork was conducted at the
Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working
Group  (M3AAWG),  a  consortium  broadly
representative  of  the  email  industry,  the  Internet
Engineering Task  Force (IETF),  which sets  technical
standards  for  Internet  infrastructure,  and  the  Internet
Corporation  for  Assigned  Names  and  Numbers
(ICANN)  which  oversees  the  unique  allocation  of
resources (such as domain names and IP addresses) for
the global Internet.
We chose these particular professional communities
since  they  presented  a  basis  for  the  analysis  of
interrelationships  in  Internet  infrastructure  across
geographies and functions. The relational comparison
between NANOG and SANOG serves to illustrate the
differences  and  connections  between  the  North
American  context,  which  is  relatively  central  to
Internet  infrastructure,  and  the  South  Asian  context,
which  is  relatively  peripheral.  Research  into  the
M3AAWG, IETF and ICANN alongside NANOG and
SANOG  supported  the  analysis  of  the  relationships
between the everyday practices of network operations,
and the functions of  industry coordination,  standards
development  and  resource  allocation  for  Internet
infrastructure. For a detailed discussion and analysis of
the themes from this research, see [24].
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4. Risk in Interdependent Systems: Three  
Cases
In the cases which we present here, we build on the
concepts established in the prior section. In each case,
we describe the nature of risk and interdependence in
the technological system under study. We then examine
the  combination  of  trust  relationships  and  assurance
structures  –  and  the  professional  communities,
practices and organizational forms through which these
are realized – that stabilize and order the technological
system.  As  we  will  show, social  trust  is  an  integral
component of the practice of managing these systems,
and  must  be  understood  as  such,  rather  than  as  a
problem to be engineered away.
4.1. IP Address Hijacking
As of this writing, the Internet is composed of over
55,000 interconnected  computer  networks [10].  Each
computer network originates one or more blocks of IP
address  space,  which  are  used  to  address  computers
located  within  that  network.  IP  address  hijacking
occurs  when  one  network  attempts  to  capture  data
traffic actually intended for another network.
Networks  can  carry  traffic  intended  for  other
networks, and in fact often need to do so. A network
operated  by  an  organization,  or  an  Internet  service
provider,  may  pay  a  larger  network  which  provides
regional  connectivity,  to  carry  data  traffic  within  a
geographical  region. A regional network may in turn
pay  an  even  larger  network  to  carry  traffic  across
regions,  and  continents.  It  is  through this  system of
interconnections between networks, spanning different
geographical scales, that the global Internet is realized.
The technology which enables the interconnection
of  networks  is  called  the  Border  Gateway  Protocol
(BGP). Using BGP, networks announce the IP address
blocks  to  which  they  can  carry  traffic  to  their
neighboring  networks.  These  neighbors  in  turn
announce these IP address blocks to their neighboring
networks, and so on. If the same IP address block is
received  from two neighbors  (i.e.,  there are  multiple
possible  routes  to  the  same  destination),  a  network
administrator configures local routing policy to prefer
one  neighbor over  another,  depending on a  range of
variables, such as bandwidth and diversity of points of
interconnection  and  the  cost  of  carrying  traffic.  The
result is a distributed routing system – called the inter-
domain routing system – through which every network
has  knowledge  of  which  neighbor  it  should  use  to
reach a particular IP address.
BGP is amongst  the most essential  infrastructural
technologies  of  the  Internet.  In  the  absence  of  the
interconnections enabled by BGP, there would be no
Internet.
As critical as BGP is to the correct functioning of
the Internet, it provides no mechanisms for a network
to establish the veracity of the routing claims received
from neighboring networks. Any network may claim to
be able to carry traffic to any IP address block using
BGP. Immediate neighbors can verify the authenticity
of these claims for IP address blocks which a network
is authorized to originate (i.e., for IP addresses which
reach computers within that network).  However, it  is
much more difficult to establish veracity when dealing
with  routing  announcements  claiming  the  ability  to
carry traffic to IP address blocks in remote networks.
In order to reach a given destination IP address, traffic
from  one  network  often  needs  to  transit  several
intermediary  networks.  The  network  from which  the
traffic  originates has no way of knowing whether  or
not any of these intermediaries can actually carry the
traffic to its intended destination.
Although the everyday experience of the Internet is
stable  –  traffic  is  correctly  delivered  to  expected
destinations  –  spurious  announcements  of  routing
information in BGP are not an uncommon occurrence,
whether as mistakes of configuration, or as intentional
efforts  to  redirect  and  capture  traffic  [11][12][13].
These  kinds  of  attacks  are  known  as  IP  address
hijacking,  in  which  one  network  hijacks  traffic
intended for the IP address blocks of another network.
The  only  effective  remedy  currently  in  place
against IP address hijacking is the “prefix filter”, which
is documented as a best current practice by the Internet
Engineering Task  Force (IETF),  which sets  technical
standards for the Internet [14]. If a network knows the
list of IP address blocks which a neighbor is authorized
to  originate,  it  may  use  a  prefix  filter  to  block  the
announcement  of  any  IP  address  blocks  outside  the
authorized  list.  This  approach  works  well  when  a
network  is  dealing  with  neighboring  networks  who
only announce their own IP address space (such as a
campus network,  or a data center),  and do not carry
traffic for any other networks.
However – as we have already noted – it becomes
infeasible  to  apply  prefix  filters  when  dealing  with
networks  which  do  carry  traffic  for  other  networks.
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Under these conditions, the only meaningful response
is one of trust. Administrators responsible for operating
a  network  must  trust  that  their  counterparts  in
neighboring  networks  will  follow  best  practices  in
securing their networks, and ensure that they will not
be the source of an IP address hijacking event. In the
process  of  setting  up  and  maintaining  an
interconnection  between  networks,  administrators  in
each  network  will  often  have  to  communicate  with
each  other,  and in  the process  form a sense  of  each
other's  competency,  and  over  repeated  interactions
build a social relationship of trust. In the instance that a
prefix hijacking event (or other network security issue
which  affects  neighbors)  occurs,  both  the  technical
relationship  of  interconnection  and  the  social
relationship  of  trust  will  be  re-evaluated,  and  in
extreme  cases,  terminated.  Commenting  on  the
importance  of  interpersonal  trust  relationships,  a
network  administrator  told  us,  “[trust]  is  pretty  big
because if you’ve got a good contact in your upstream
[network]  for  example,  and  you can  at  least  talk  to
them, and get something done, or if there’s nastiness
emanating from one particular network, then it’s good
if you can talk to somebody because really, if you don’t
have  good  contacts,  the  chances  of  influencing
anything is pretty slim really, right.”
It is not only in the practice and process of network
interconnection  that  social  trust  relationships  are
formed  between  network  administrators.  Trust
relationships are also formed at meetings of regionally
organized  professional  communities  of  network
administrators,  such  as  the  North  America  Network
Operators Group (NANOG), the South Asian Network
Operators Group (SANOG), and many more. Meetings
of these groups typically occur between 2 and 3 times
every  year  across  locations within their  geographies,
with  ongoing  discussion  of  computer  networking
issues on dedicated email lists. Socializing in person,
making presentations,  and participating in workshops
at  these  meetings  all  contribute  to  the  formation  of
social  trust  relationships  between  attendees,  and  the
evaluation  of  reputation  (for  running a  well-behaved
network,  and  for  technical  knowledge)  within  a
community.  A  senior  member  of  the  NANOG
community  summed  up  these  dynamics  in  an
interview: “Certainly NANOG is one of the places …
where you can become a trusted individual … where
you can  get  up  and  talk about  problems that  you’re
seeing in the network, to get other people together that
are seeing the same problem, to generate more push to
get  the  processes  changed,  and  [Internet  Service
Providers]  work  with  each  other.  I  see  that  as  very
important.”
The stability of the critical Internet infrastructure of
interconnections between networks is assured through
trust  relationships  formed in the practice  of  network
interconnection  and  in  professional  communities  of
network administrators. 
4.2. Email Spam
Email spam is a problem that is almost as old as the
Internet itself [15]. Whether as advertising, scams, or
other  communications,  email  spam  is  universally
unwanted.
The  fundamental  problem  for  email  is  one  of
openness,  which is similar  in many ways to that  for
network  interconnection.  Just  as  network
interconnection  should  allow  any  IP  address  on  the
Internet to send and receive any traffic from any other
IP address, email assumes that any email server should
be able to send and receive any email from any other
email server. Open systems provide for great autonomy
and ease of interconnectivity, but introduce significant
problems of interdependence at the same time. Anyone
can  set  up  an  email  server  under  their  own control,
configure it as they wish, and immediately be able to
send and  receive  email  from any other  email  server
with no additional  effort.  The problem, of course,  is
that  such  an  open  system also  provides  the  grounds
upon  which  spam  may  be  sent  and  received  with
similar ease.
A common  defense  against  spam,  which  anyone
who  uses  email  is  familiar  with,  is  the  spam  filter,
which  attempts  to  distinguish  spam  from  legitimate
email.  However,  spam  filters  only  sort  spam  at  its
destination, once it has been delivered. From a network
security  perspective,  it  is  preferable  to  stop spam as
close  to  its  origin  as  possible,  to  save  bandwidth,
storage and processor cycles for email servers. This is
especially  concerning,  since recent  estimates  indicate
that spam is well over 50% of all email [16]. In this
section,  we  describe  the  mechanisms  through  which
network level anti-spam efforts are made possible. 
In the early days of the Internet, stopping spam was
often simply a matter of contacting the administrator of
the email server originating spam, and asking them to
suspend the offending email account. This was a viable
approach at the time, since there was a relatively small
number  of  email  servers,  and  most  email  server
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administrators knew one another [15]. As the Internet
grew, and  the  number  of  email  servers  increased,  it
became unreasonable to combat spam through personal
relationships  among  email  server  administrators.  In
contrast  with BGP, where  each  computer  network  is
directly  connected  to  only  a  limited  set  of  other
computer  networks,  every  email  server  is  potentially
connected to every other email server on the Internet,
drastically  increasing  the  complexity  of
interdependence in this system.
The  solutions  to  the  problem  of  spam  have
therefore  necessarily  taken  the  form  of  assurance
structures. A variety of for-profit and non-profit entities
(such  as  SpamHaus,  SORBS,  SpamCop  and  others)
provide regularly updated lists of email servers that are
primarily  sources  of  spam which should be blocked.
Block lists  vary from being manually maintained,  to
those  which  look  for  patterns  of  spam  in  email  to
automatically  identify  spam  sources.  Email  server
operators may choose to subscribe to one or more of
these block lists to identify email servers from which
they should not accept  any inbound email,  or  which
they treat as a spam source to which additional policy
must be applied before delivering email.
In the instance that an email server operator feels
that  they  have  been  wrongly  categorized  as  a  spam
source  by  a  block  list,  they  must  follow  guidelines
published  on  block  list  websites  to  facilitate  their
removal.  These  guidelines  are  typically  purely
technical  in  nature,  such  as  requiring  that  the
proportion of spam has been below a certain threshold
for a certain period of time before removal from the
block list.
The  relationship  between  email  senders,  email
receivers and block lists is complicated by the fact that
advertisers  (or  email  services  providing  support  for
advertisers) do need to send large quantities of email,
while at the same time avoiding being listed on block
lists. In many ways, the behavior of a large advertiser
can resemble that of a spam source. The notion of what
is,  and  is  not,  spam is  no  longer  as  straightforward
when considering these commercial relationships.
The organizational  space  in  which  these  tensions
are worked out in practice is  the Messaging,  Mobile
and Malware Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3WAAG).
This is an international industry consortium which was
initially  created  as  a  space  for  coordination between
email services, and later expanded to include issues of
messaging  on  mobile  phones,  and  of  malware.
M3AAWG meets three times a year, across locations in
Europe  and  North  America,  with  ongoing
communications  on  several  email  lists.  Presentations
and discussions at M3AAWG often deal with making
sense  of  best  practices  among  the  diverse  interests
represented  at  M3AAWG.  These  discussions  may
eventually be published as best practice documents, for
consumption beyond the core M3AAWG membership.
For  instance,  the  Vetting  Best  Common  Practices
document [17] deals with processes that email service
providers should follow in signing up new customers,
to  ensure  that  these  customers  do  not  use  the  email
service  provider's  infrastructure  to  send  spam.  Over
lunch  at  a  M3AAWG  meeting  in  San  Francisco,  a
Brazilian  email  operator  related  his  interests  in
attending the M3AAWG meeting, in spite of the time
and money involved in travel  from Brazil:  “this is  a
place  to  network,  to  build  trust  amongst  different
groups, coordinate and collaborate, and get a sense of
what different parties' interests are: hosting providers,
email service providers, law enforcement…”.
Attendance  at  M3AAWG  meetings  is  limited  to
employees  of  M3AAWG  member  organizations  and
their guests. Admission to membership in M3AAWG is
controlled by the M3AAWG board, which adjudicates
new membership applications – and conducts  annual
reviews of existing memberships – based on whether
or not an organization is recognized as a responsible
well-behaved actor within the messaging ecosystem.1
Unlike the regional network operator groups surveyed
in the last section, which are open for anyone to attend,
M3AAWG  intentionally  limits  attendance  to  ensure
that bad actors are unable to participate in the sense-
making around the policy and practice of messaging.
For  example,  our  attendance  at  M3AAWG meetings
was  only  made  possible  through  a  guest  invitation
facilitated  by  a  M3AAWG  member  organization.
Every  presentation  we  attended  at  M3AAWG  was
prefaced  with  a  notice  reminding  attendees  that  the
contents of the presentation were not to be publicized
outside the context of the M3AAWG meeting.
Even  though  the  everyday  practice  of  combating
email spam relies on the assurance structures of block
lists,  the  processes  through  which  notions  of  best
practice and policy are formed take place through trust
relationships in a professional community anchored by
the organizational form of M3AAWG.
1 See https://www.m3aawg.org/join for details, last retrieved June 9th,
2016.
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4.3. Domain Name Spoofing
The  Domain  Name  System  (DNS)  provides  the
means  through  which  a  human-readable  name  for  a
service  on  the  Internet  is  resolved  to  an  IP address
through which to reach the computer system providing
the service. DNS is used in almost any interaction that
occurs in everyday use of the Internet, resolving names
to  IP  addresses  for  web  servers,  email  servers,  file
servers, and more. Accordingly, there is great power in
the  operation  of  DNS  servers:  a  rogue  DNS  server
operator  may spoof domain names, resolving domain
names to IP addresses of their choosing, intercepting
all traffic to those domain names, and modifying it at
will, potentially impersonating a service to gather login
credentials and other sensitive information.
DNS  functions  through  a  hierarchy  of  servers.
Whenever a lookup is performed on DNS, the request
initially goes to one of the root servers, which returns
the IP address of the server for the top-level  domain
(such  as  “.com”,  “.org”  or  “.net”)  in  the  requested
domain  name.  The  request  is  then  redirected  to  the
server for the top-level domain, which in turn returns
the address of the server for requested domain (such as
“hicss.org”).  This  process  may  continue,  recursively,
until all dot-delimited names have been exhausted to
find  the  IP  address  of  the  machine  providing  a
particular service (such as “www.hicss.org”).
The  apparently  hierarchical  structure  of  DNS  is
complicated by the fact that Internet service providers
and  other  large  organizational  networks  (such  as
campus networks)  may operate their  own local  DNS
servers. Whenever a user within a network looks up a
domain  name,  the  request  goes  to  their  local  DNS
server, which then mediates the process of recursively
resolving the domain name from the root DNS servers.
Local DNS servers are points of control at which the
resolution  of  domain  names  to  IP addresses  may be
spoofed.
In  response  to  the  problem  of  domain  name
spoofing,  a  set  of  extensions  to  secure  DNS  were
developed  by  the  Internet  Engineering  Task  Force,
collectively  termed  DNSSEC.  These  extensions
provide  mechanisms  for  end  user  systems  to  detect
spoofing,  and alert  users  to such behavior. DNSSEC
functions by cryptographically  signing the root  DNS
zone,  which  holds  all  top-level  domains,  and  is
maintained  on  the  DNS root  servers.  Each  top-level
domain server in turn cryptographically signs all names
which it hosts, and so on down the hierarchy of DNS
servers. Each key used for cryptographically signing a
level of the DNS hierarchy is itself signed by the key
of the level above. As a result, an end user system can
verify a technological chain of trust leading to the root
zone, and detect if this chain has been modified in any
way.
The  problem  is  that  such  an  arrangement  is
premised  upon  a  single  root  cryptographic  key  to
maintain  both  authentication  and  control  over  the
whole  system.  The  introduction  of  DNSSEC  led  to
concerns  in  DNS  operator  community  over
accountability in the control and use of the root key.
The  root  key  for  DNSSEC is  maintained  by  the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN),  a  non-profit  entity  which  oversees  the
management of domain names, IP addresses, and other
critical Internet resources for the global Internet. In the
process  of  deploying  DNSSEC,  ICANN  created  the
Trusted  Community  Representative  position.  Trusted
Community  Representatives  are  members  of  the
Internet's  technical  community  who observe  the  key
signing  process  at  data  centers  operated  by ICANN,
and  hold  fragments  of  root  key,  to  allow  it  to  be
reconstituted in the event that it is lost.2
As  much  as  the  Trusted  Community
Representatives play an important role in maintaining
the root key, they play an even more important role in
securing  the  legitimacy  of  ICANN's  control  of
DNSSEC.  As  several  DNS  operators  told  us,  even
though they might not trust ICANN as an organization,
they trust ICANN's operation of DNSSEC insofar  as
people  who  they  trust  –  appointed  as  Trusted
Community Representatives – vouch for the integrity
of the DNSSEC process.  The assurance structure for
DNSSEC gains legitimacy from trust relationships and
reputation  maintained  by  Trusted  Community
Representatives  within  the  broader  communities  of
administrators who are responsible for operating DNS
servers,  and  implementing  DNSSEC  for  their  own
domains.
5. Trust in Technology, Trust in People
Each of the three cases surveyed above deals with
distinctively  interdependent  technological  forms,  but
the solutions to risk and uncertainty in each case may
be  made  understood  in  terms  of  social  trust
2 For a list of Trusted Community Representative, see 
https://www.iana.org/dnssec/tcrs, last retrieved June 9th, 2016.
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relationships  articulated  through  professional
communities and practices. In each case, combinations
of trust relationships and assurance structures serve to
stabilize  and  order  interdependent  technological
systems,  balancing  individual  autonomy  and
centralized control.
IP  address  hijacking  is  mitigated  through  the
technological  mechanism of  prefix  filters,  and  social
relationships of trust in the practice of interconnecting
networks.  These  trust  relationships  and  practices  are
produced and reproduced in professional communities
of network administrators. The result is a system which
has a high degree of autonomy for individual computer
networks, and very little centralized control.
Block  lists  represent  the  key  technological
assurance  structure  through  which  email  spam  is
mitigated.  Email  service  providers  and  block  list
providers  have  substantial  autonomy  in  their
operations,  and  very  little  direct  control  over  each
another. Instead, coordination and collaboration occur
among these diverse actors through trust relationships
formed within the restricted community of M3AAWG,
in  the  interests  of  constructing  and  evaluating
trustworthiness,  and  collective  sense-making  for  the
practices  and  policies  involved  in  operating  email
services.
DNSSEC  provides  a  highly  effective  antidote  to
domain  name  spoofing,  but  at  the  cost  of  a  certain
degree  of  autonomy  for  DNS  server  operators.  The
legitimacy  of  ICANN  as  the  assurance  structure
maintaining  the  root  key  for  DNSSEC  needs  the
support  of  Trusted  Community  Representatives:
technologists  with  strong  reputations  and  trust
relationships  in  the  broader  technical  communities
responsible for deploying and operating DNSSEC.
Across  these  cases,  trust  is  not  a  social  value
embedded  in  technological  form  so  much  as  it  is
necessary element of technological practice, realized in
social  relations  and  communities.  Efforts  to  secure
computer  systems  and  networks  often  focus  on
implementing more secure “trustworthy” technological
forms. While we do support these efforts, we approach
them  with  the  caution  that  they  provide  surety,  or
confidence, rather than trust [18], reposing all authority
in  technology,  often  implemented  through  strong
assurance  structures  of  centralized  control.  Such
systems  are  potentially  brittle,  susceptible  to  global
technological  failure,  and  political  capture  of
centralized  controls.  In  contrast,  a  system  which
privileges  social  trust  relationships  is  prone  to  local
failures,  but  more  resilient  as  a  whole,  though  it
requires  substantial  investment  in  distributed
communities and practices for reliable operation.
Here  lies  the  trust  paradox:  highly  autonomous
systems with weak assurance structures lead to strong
trust  relationships,  while  highly  controlled  systems
with strong assurance structures do away with the need
for  trust  relationships  [19].  As  we  have  argued,  the
answer  is  not  to  choose  either  trust  relationships  or
assurance structures, but to imagine a combination of
both.  A  trustworthy  computing  system  may  be
designed  with  a  strong  assurance  structure;  but  this
assurance  structure  still  needs  legitimacy  from  the
communities of practice who will  be subject  to it  in
order  gain  acceptance  for  its  authority.  Similarly,  a
computing system may be designed with strong trust
relationships in mind; but this system will still need to
take  into  account  the  effort  involved  in  developing
professional  communities  of  practice  to anchor these
trust  relationships,  and  the  potential  assurance
structures which may yet be required by the system.
6. A Path Forward: Accounting for Social 
Trust in Internet Infrastructure
Cybersecurity is typically characterized in terms of
problems  of  attack  and  defense,  of  incentives  and
compliance, and of technological design. While all of
these  are  necessary  and  valuable  approaches  to
cybersecurity,  we  argue  that  the  application  of
cybersecurity  to  interdependent  systems  –  such  as
those  which  we  have  described  here  –  calls  for
attention to problems of social trust.
It  is  necessary, but  not sufficient,  for  instance,  to
examine  incentive  structures  for  the  deployment  of
secure  extensions  to  technology,  such  as  DNSSEC.
Equally,  the  political  problem  of  maintaining  the
legitimacy  –  the  trustworthiness  –  of  the  authority
managing  the  DNSSEC  root  is  a  critical  issue.
Incentives and legal regimes can account for the forces
driving  competing  organizations  together  in  the
formation  of  M3AAWG.  However,  these  alone  are
insufficient  to  understand  the  functioning  of
M3AAWG  as  a  community  with  a  restricted
membership forming trust  relationships  and common
understandings  of  practice  around  the  mitigation  of
email  spam.  Similarly,  the  function  of  professional
communities of network operators cannot be explained
only  in  terms  of  incentives  and  regulations  around
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particular  aspects  of  network  interconnection.  Thick
relationships  of  trust  and  common understandings of
practice are formed within these communities, easing
the  coordination  and  collaboration  needed  in  the
everyday practice of network interconnection.
The design of new technologies intended to provide
more secure networked computing environments must
take  into  account  the  social  trust  required  in  the
practice of operating these systems. This is especially
true  when  a  system  is  composed  of  interdependent
components,  spanning  territorial  and  organizational
contexts.  In  such  cases,  professional  communities  of
technical  personnel  responsible  for  the  everyday
operation  of  these  systems  must  be  seeded  and
supported to provide spaces for the production of trust
relationships and sense-making around shared concepts
of  “best  practices”  for  operating  these  systems.  For
example,  NANOG  was  created  and  initially  funded
under  the  auspices  of  the  US  National  Science
Foundation, to support  a professional  community for
coordination between the technical personnel involved
in  operating  the  computer  networks  of  the  early
Internet [24].
At the same time, careful attention must be paid to
the technological form of the system. Does it require a
single central authority for its reliable operation? Does
it allow for multiple optional authorities? In each case,
the question of how these authorities might maintain
their  legitimacy  and  trustworthiness  is  critical,  and
must be addressed with the technical communities who
rely  on  these  authorities  in  their  everyday  practice.
These  kinds  of  issues  are  very  apparent  in  the
deployment  of  DNSSEC,  and  in  ongoing  efforts  to
secure  BGP  which  similarly  rely  on  centralized
authorities to assure security [25].
The functioning of  the interdependent  systems of
Internet infrastructure must be understood in terms of
shared  understandings  of  practice,  formed  between
geographically distributed communities,  supported by
trustworthy  assurance  structures.  Such  analysis  is
complicated  by  variations  in  market  structures  and
legal  regimes  across  geographies  and  over  time,
alongside  evolutions  in  technological  form.  These
varying  pressures  can  be  difficult  to  make sense  of,
both  internally  for  those  involved  in  operating  a
system,  and  externally,  for  those  aiming  to  analyze
existing  systems  and  design  new systems.  However,
social trust relationships offer the necessary lubrication
and glue to ease and maintain the operation of these
systems in the face of complex interactions of market
structures, legal regimes and technological forms [24].
These are but a few guidelines for thinking about
how  to  support  trustworthy  social  operational
environments  for  secure  networked  computing
systems,  as  necessary  adjuncts  to  technological,
economic  and  legal  analysis.  Through  the  ongoing
growth and evolution of these systems, it is important
to continue to pay attention to the ethical dilemmas and
social norms which emerge in the practices of technical
communities.  As the cases  which we have  presented
illustrate,  there  are  ample  precedents  in  the
development of Internet infrastructure to draw from in
thinking about the design of future secure technologies.
Designing  systems  with  social  values  of  trust  in
mind is as much a political and social problem as it is a
technological problem. It is essential that social trust be
taken as a primary object of study in the analysis of the
complex  interdependent  systems which  make  up  the
critical infrastructure of the Internet. 
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